Reconsidering the EU technological sovereignty in the automotive industry through the prism of the Chinese Photovoltaic (PV) strategies in Africa

Keywords:

Abstract:

Purpose:
2026 is characterized by the end of uncertainties in the sense that Allison (2015) prediction considering the Thucydides Trap has become a reality further to many escalations (Jetin, 2023). Indeed, the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China has raised a new stage with the direct military intervention of the American army in Venezuela and Iran and its subsequent energy shock.
In the last years, the EU has lost 1) access to cheap energy from the Russian Federation, 2) the military umbrella from the US and 3) affordable Chinese workforce due to the new tariffs. Logically, the worldwide EU GDP market share keeps declining. And is involved in a war at his borders in Ukraine.
More precisely, the EU automotive industry has also lost momentum in the sense that 1) Chinese BEV & PHEV cars increase their traction (despite high inventories), 2) they do not have access to critical raw materials (and specifically lithium batteries) and 3) they cumulate delays in manufacturing autonomous cars vis-à-vis American & Chinese competitors (Pardi, 2026).
As such, the EU automotive industry is a relevant example of the declining technological sovereignty that the EU experiments in many sectors.
In this paper, as in the ERA-form (2025) stipulated: “technological sovereignty should be understood not only with regards to EU self-sufficiency, rather as playing a key role (by becoming an indispensable supplier or by ensuring a trustworthy supply partnership) in global value chains”.
Considering the critical new role assumed by China in the automotive global value chain, this paper assumes that 1) at least in the next two to three years, the Chinese influence will keep increasing, 2) despite the EU-Mercosur Agreement (2026), the “Donroe” doctrine will prevail in Latin America, and 3) despite the EU-India Agreement (2026), geopolitical tensions in Asia will not favor a winning EU automotive industry in the continent.
Therefore, the more reliable strategic option for the EU automotive industry is Africa. This orientation makes more sense indeed taking into account 1) the Africa GDP growth, 2) the lack of a decisive local player and 3) the former influence of the EU in the region.
The decision to choose the African prism is not only a matter of geopolitical tensions. Indeed, Chinese influence in the continent is patent in the last twenty years and therefore some lessons can be withdrawn from their competitive playbook in terms of what a strong Chinese technological print may mean for the EU competitive sovereignty.
In that sense, the PV energy in Africa is extremely relevant. Due to a control of the value chain that may go between 80% to 95%, Chinese companies have been able to prevent any non - Chinese players to compete locally, without using the regulatory basis.
Moreover, the comparison is extremely accurate based on the fact that 1) lithium mines are already open in Africa (when there are not in the EU due to ESG constraints), 2) Chinese companies have won some contracts in Africa and they increase their presence in more than twenty countries in the continent and 3) some strategic patterns emerge from their presence in Africa be it in terms of strengths and weaknesses.
Therefore, the EU automotive industry may learn many insights from a benchmark of Chinese PV companies to figure out where to posit in the value & supply chains.
Design
This paper considers three cases (Morocco, Egypt and South Africa) considering the strategy of Chinese players in each country for the most three critical minerals (silicon, silver and lithium) in the global PV value chain. Indeed, silicon constitutes the 95% backbone of solar panels with high purity polysilicon. Silver plays a key role in conductivity. As such, these two first critical minerals are less relevant for the automotive industry, on the contrary of lithium batteries.
If at the beginning of the trade war between the US and China, Chinese companies had extremely high inventories in PV (similar to BEV’s and PHEV’s currently), they managed to sell these inventories and moved to the constitution of regional hubs in Africa (Ehl, 2025). Due to their economic potential, Morocco, Egypt and South Africa constitute a good benchmark to understand the evolution of Chinese PV strategies in the last five years. The analysis will be made following the matrix that is in the Apendix 1.
Findings
As Chinese PV firms try to secure the global PV value chain (Pin, 2026), it is reasonable to assume that the same policy will be applied by Chinese carmakers. In that sense, it is probable that, except if disruptive technology emerges, the lock-in of the European automotive carmakers will increase with extremely low margins of maneuver later on for to retaliate.
Moreover, as the Chinese PV global value chain is secured at the most valuable segments, positioning in the upper layers of the supply chain seems to be the most relevant option for the EU carmakers.
Practical and theoretical implications
The study of the Chinese PV industry provides some key-insights for the EU automotive industry. If the opportunity of public-private partners remains an option, it is clear that regulatory issues should become far stricter to protect the EU technological sovereignty first. Second, being able to refine critical minerals is the key success factor to regain some independence in the global value chain. Only when this condition has been fulfilled that EU-African partnerships will make sense.
Third, but not least, as it appeared in the past in the conclusions of many GERPISA works, there is not a “one size fits all model” for the Chinese PV strategies. Nor should the EU automotive industries answers be monolithic.