| La Lettre du GERPISA | no 154 (octobre 2001) |
Editorial - Yannick Lung
Viewed in some quarters as a reinforcement of the competitive forces
which accompany internationalisation, certain analysts affirm that globalisation
inevitably leads to a form of concentration that is driven by those mergers
and acquisitions which the automobile industry has been continuing to undertake,
despite the heretofore unproven long-term efficiency of such moves. Recent
events bearing witness to this behaviour include BMW's hiving off of Rover;
DaimlerChrysler's troublesome merger; and the problems that Ford has experienced
despite (or because of?) its focus on the top-of-the-range segment (Jaguar,
Volvo, Land Rover). Are these problems temporary in nature, caused by a
de-phasing of producers' varying product range cycles (with some offering
products that appear old when compared with their competitors' offerings)
- or are they structural manifestations of the hurdles faced in creating
rapprochements between firms pursuing diverging profit strategies or industrial
models? The issues Robert Boyer and Michel Freyssenet raised during their
recent GERPISA colloquium presentation deserves further discussion, although
it already clear that the new analysis they offer of the automobile sector's
history of mergers and acquisitions provides interpretative keys that can
be used to understand current reconfigurations.
Certainly a number of M&A succeed in the long run, often after a
long period of time has elapsed or else following the outbreak of a crisis
situation (GM, Peugeot-Citroën). In fact, although this is more infrequent,
some even succeed in the short run, that is, as long as no incompatibility
exists between the firms (see Seat's and Skoda's acquisition by VW). Many
carmakers are understandably reticent to commit to a M&A's course that
may well be just as much a self-fulfilling prophecy as it is a requirement
for competitiveness and profitability.
Instead of this race to merge, Toyota and PSA Peugeot-Citroën,
which have just concluded an alliance to produce a small city car in Europe
(see the article by Jean-Jacques Chanaron), offer a strategy that is based
on pragmatic and diversified alliances. In the current economic environment,
this has been a clear economic and financial success. Toyota has acted
quite sensibly, pursuing an alliance policy that is no more than a complement
to its fundamental strategy, which is based on internal growth. This strategy
should enable Toyota to become by the end of the year the leading Japanese
producer in North America, a region where it has invested in a cautious
manner (firstly through NUMMI, its joint venture with GM), avoiding the
precipitous path that Honda has been following. It should also become leader
in Europe, even though Nissan began investing here so much earlier than
Toyota did. This is due to the fact that Toyota's Yaris plant in Valenciennes
is due to come online over the next few months, and also because of the
new unit that the company, together with PSA, will be opening in Poland
in the near future. The Toyotian model has demonstrated a remarkable capacity
for adaptation (see Takahiro Fujimoto's contribution to this debate). Its
specificity seems to preclude any bouts of sudden expansion, restricting
the company both to a progressive type of growth and also to alliances
that are local in nature.
For PSA, the alliance strategy would clearly seem to comprise an alternative
that enables the company to resist the general trend whilst maintaining
its specificity through an increased number of targeted alliances in Europe.
Such alliances are intended to offset the insufficient volumes that result
from a standalone type of production. This applies both to the mechanical
subsystems that PSA has been making together with Renault (V6 engine, automatic
transmission) and Ford (diesel engine) and also to the low-volume vehicle
segment in which it has become active (light commercial vehicles and minivans
with Fiat, mini urban cars with Toyota). This co-operative approach would
appear to be a successful one for PSA, even if its current performances
are actually the result of its well advised renewal of its product range.
However the success of this product renewal could also be explained by
the fact that the firm has not had to use up its resources and talents
in managing the difficulties that are inherent to M&A and global strategic
alliances - as Renault has had to do with Nissan.
An alliance strategy whose purpose is the occupation of new market segments
creates new opportunities. If the so-called "P3" project actually materialises
(i.e., with Pininfarina and the Portuguese components making industry co-operating
to design and manufacture a new hybrid urban vehicle), this will constitute
an interesting testing ground for co-operative strategies involving an
association of components makers with engineering firms. The growing externalisation
of design activities to engineering firms and the development of the major
components making groups' integrative capabilities create conditions in
which it becomes possible for a vehicle to be assembled by firms other
than the established carmakers. However, this latter group's involvement
still seems to be necessary, at one point or the other, particularly when
there is a need to deal with the issue of motorisation (i.e., whenever
independent transmission producers such as ZF or Getrag are present, to
large extent the engine still remains the carmakers' exclusive domain,
unless the emergence of alternative propulsion modes leads to the appearance
of new actors). Moreover, carmakers may also still need to be involved
in retail and maintenance activities (the selling of automobiles in large
retail outlets has not yet replaced the need for dealership networks, particularly
in Europe).
If we remember the attempts to rescue the Rover brand also included
getting components makers (not to mention employees) involved in new projects,
it is clear that the co-operation option is being mainly explored in an
effort to resist both current mergermania as well as the development of
global oligopolies, particularly in Europe.