La lettre du GERPISA no 89

Debate  Andrew Mair


Trajectories, Crises, Strategies, Old Industrial Models and New Industrial Models : a Sketch of Complex Combinations

The GERPISA programme focuses on the emergence of new industrial models. But are there firms which have kept the same industrial model during the whole period being examined by the GERPISA pro~ramme (1970-1995)? These firms may experience significant changes of strategy, deep crises and/or strong growth, they may undertake new investments in new countries and regions and/or withdraw from other regions; all without changing their basic industrial model (evolutions but not revolutions). Perhaps there are also firms with trajectories that are not marked by crises (of work, financial/market) that have afflicted firms like Renault, Chrysler, British Leyland, General Motors, Mazda etc. Hence there would be basically four types of trajectories (two intersecting dimensions).

1-Firms with trajectories marked by crises and step changes, where the step changes occasion adoption of a new or radically changed (revolutionary) industrial model (Rover. Chrysler, Renault?). Is this the point of reference established by Michel Freyssenet for the "Trajectories" group?

2-Firms with trajectories marked by crises but no significant change (evolution) to the basic industrial model (Ford?).

3-Firms with trajectories with no significant crises and no significant change (evolution) in the basic industrial model (BMW, Honda?).

4-Firms with trajectories with no significant crises but which have nevertheless changed (revolution) their basic industrial model (is this an empty set? Be careful not to confuse non-risis change in business strategy with adoption of a new industrial model).

We do not need to dwell on the first category since it may form the reference point developed by Michel Freyssenet. The fourth category may be an "empty set". What about the second and third categories?

Second category

Ford has certainly experienced its share of crises in North America and Europe. With apologies to Gérard Bordenave if I reveal my naivety, hypothetically Ford has maintained the continuity of an essentially Fordist model of production over the l970-1995 period despite a little hybridization through integration of "quality processes". Ford's focus on cost, its model range, its long and expensive R&D process, its "one car per factory" production organization, the absence of anything approaching "smoothing" of production at its European factories, its new global organizational structure, all these are fragments of evidence which bear the hallmarks of Fordist principles (what I have elsewhere called "fast Fordism"). Similarly, is the MIT team correct to claim that Ford in North America is an exemplar of a new "lean production" industrial model? Is Ford still pursuing the - far from negligible - unfulfilled promise of Fordism (sunk costs, path dependency etc)?. Indeed during the 1970-1990 period in the United Kingdom Ford was still trying to introduce Fordism in the first place.

Third category

Hypothetically, candidates for crisis-free trajectories accumpanied by evolution of the same industrial model are firms which have experienced major success over this period, perhaps BMW, Toyota and Honda, even including Volkswagen (only Japan and Germany are represented in this category). At least this was true until the early 1990s: now BMW may be the only firm left in this category. Has BMW's particular business strategy (image, quality, price) created a (financial) space for the survival of a particular low-pressure flexible Gcrman-industrial model? (Note also Land Rover's low-pressure flexible-British model: by contrast perhaps the low-pressure industrial models at Jaguar and Mercedes spun out of control.) Honda and Toyota have experienced market crises and work crises respectively and Toyota is experimenting with industrial models (evolution surely, but perhaps revolution?). Honda's innovation-product-led business strategy, parallel to BMW's and Land Rover's, has created (financial) space for a low-pressure flexible-Japanese industrial model.

With apologies to Ulrich Jürgens for my naivety, Volkswagen appears to have maintained a crisis-free German-Fordist model long after it was "overdue". Like Ford, perhaps it has been able to do so by pursuing the untapped potential of Fordism with its business strategy for Eastern and Southern Europe (Skoda, SEAT). Is Volkswagen still essentially spreading Fordism to the firms of these regions, and hence buying time for Fordism in Lower Saxony? Are FIAT's Eastern European ventures parallel?

These examples are meant to provoke, as hypotheses. Trajectories are clearly very varied accross firms, involving evolutions, revolutions, crises, and pressures to spread old industrial models over time and space as well as develop and spread new models.leads us to the important work of the hybridization group...


Index of number 89 ;
All the Debates in La Lettre du GERPISA ;
Available numbers ;
Information on this server.